Abstract-In this paper, a pollution regulation game model under multiple principal-agent among government, pollutant treatment enterprise and Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) is developed to study the pollution regulation mechanism under centralized treatment mode. The optimal regulation mechanism is obtained through theoretic and numeric analysis. It is found that with the supervision costs on pollutant emission, government can not achieve the optimal social welfare but the sub-optimal through supervision and regulation; government should charge a fine as big as possible on pollutant treatment enterprise instead of SMEs to reduce the emission of untreated pollutants, and guide the price-making of pollutant treatment enterprise instead of making by itself freely, in order to increase social welfare.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to the flexible business management and quick response to market change, small and medium enterprises (SMEs) made a great contribution to the development of China's economy, including more than 60% of GDP, 50% of tax and 80% of employment. Meanwhile, because of the lack of pollution treatment capability and awareness, SMEs directly discharge lots of pollutants created in their production process and cause a serious damage to the environment and social welfare [1] . It is a great challenge facing the environmental protection department and the whole society how to develop appropriate pollution regulation for SMEs according to their characteristics, in order to achieve a win-win situation of SMEs' development and environmental protection [2] .
There are two main methods adopted by government to regulate SMEs' pollutant emission, one is installing and improving monitor equipment [3] [4] [5] , the other is making regulatory policies, such as the emissions quota trading [6] and emission tax [7] , which are mainly effective for large enterprises. Due to the characteristics of SMEs, which are small scale, numerous and widely scattered, treating pollutants by themselves is not only beyond the ability of the most, but also lead to some problems, such as, scale diseconomies, waste of pollutant treatment resources and the failure of reaching the pollutant treatment standards, and the difficulty of regulation. Therefore, more and more countries and regions began the implementation of centralized treatment to solve these problems, that is, concentrating SMEs into the industrial park, and introducing a professional pollutant treatment enterprise to treat pollutants created by SMEs [8] . Guldmann and Shefer developed a cost-effectiveness optimization approach to industrial location planning and air quality management, focusing on the feasibility of a centralized air-pollution-control system, and applied a simplified linear programming formulation of the general model to the Haifa area [9] . Roomratanapun studied the factors determining the acceptability of centralized wastewater treatment by a case study of Introducing it in Bangkok [10] . Yuan, Jiang and Bi examined the result of applying centralized treatment in Shengze Town, Suzhou City in 2000 to 2008 and found the key factors contributing to the success [11] . Cui, Meng and Liu established a pricing model for centralized pollutant treatment mode to obtain the qualification of adopting centralized treatment, the optimal pricing strategy, and the policy suggestion for improving social welfare [12] . Hu and Huang established a regulation game model among government, SMEs and the pollutant treatment enterprise to study the optimal policies of pollutant emission regulation and pricing of pollutant treatment under centralized treatment mode [13] . However, the above studies ignored the possibility of SMEs' or pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission, which is the main cause of pollution regulation. Furthermore, they ignore the multiple principal-agent relationship among government, SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise, which is feature of centralized treatment mode, that is, the government commissions SMEs to emit pollutants to pollutant treatment enterprise, and commission the pollutant treatment enterprise to treat pollutants, and even regulate SMEs' emission behavior taking its information advantage on government behalf. Therefore, the principal-agent problem is much more complicated in centralized treatment mode, it is necessary to apply principal-agent theory [14, 15] and mechanism design theory [16, 17] to design appropriate regulatory mechanisms, in order to prevent the SMEs' or pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission, and regulate pollutant treatment enterprise's pricing behavior.
Therefore, in this paper, a pollution regulation game model under multiple principal-agent among government, pollutant treatment enterprise and SMEs is developed to study the pollution regulation mechanism under centralized treatment mode, and obtain the optimal solution through theoretical and numerical analysis. This paper has two major contributions. First, it provides a pollution regulation mechanism and policy suggestion under centralized treatment mode. Second, the conclusion of this paper can be a theoretical evidence for the decision making of government, pollutant treatment enterprise and SMEs for the realization of win-win situation between environment protection and economy development.
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION AND THE MODEL

A. Problem Description
There are several SMEs producing a same product, and the pollutants as by-product, the quantity of which is related to the output of production. Untreated pollutants directly emitted into the environment causes damage on the environment, resulting in the reduction of social welfare, and the extent of the damage of pollutants on the environment and social welfare is related to the quantity of untreated pollutants.
As the SMEs' characteristics of small-scale, low capital, laggard technology of production and pollutant treatment, treating by themselves can not reach the pollutant treatment standard and economics scale, meanwhile their wide spread makes government supervision much harder. Therefore, government concentrates them together to produce, and introduces a professional pollutant treatment enterprise to treat their pollutants, who charges them according to their pollutant emissions.
As there is little differences among the products produced by SMEs, the competition among SMEs is mainly price competition. Besides, the environment damage and loss of social welfare caused by untreated pollutants directly emitted into the environmental is borne by the whole society, among which the part borne by a SME is almost zero while it needs to undertake all the pollutant treatment costs. Therefore, a "rational" SME emits all its pollutants untreated into environment to reduce pollutant treatment cost and total cost of product, and improve the competitiveness of its product consequently under the condition of no government regulation. Thus, government needs to regulate the emission behavior of SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise, and punish the stealthy emission of untreated pollutants, in order to prevent it.
Under centralized treatment mode, being the supplier of pollutant treatment service for SMEs, the pollutant treatment enterprise has the information advantage over government on SMEs' emission. For the purpose of reducing social cost and improving regulatory efficiency, it is a better choice for government and whole society that government translate part of its supervision duty on SMEs' emission to pollutant treatment enterprise. Therefore, government commissions pollutant treatment enterprise to supervise SMEs' emission, and promised a award for its finding SMEs stealthy emission. At the same time, in order to urge them to strengthen the supervision, government still supervises SMEs emission, and informs pollutant treatment enterprise, if government finds SMEs' stealthy emission while it does not, it will be punished.
Under centralized treatment mode, not only SMEs but also pollutant treatment enterprise has the incentive to emit untreated pollutants. Besides, as all SMEs emit pollutants to it, its stealthy emission of untreated pollutants incurs a much greater environment damage and loss of social. Thus, government should commit a more rigorous supervision and punishment to prevent its stealthy emission.
The government's supervision and regulation on stealthy emission of SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise can reduce it, but incurs a certain supervision cost. Government loosening its supervision can save the corresponding cost, but may cause excessive increase of the stealthy emission of untreated pollutants, resulting in a bigger social cost of environmental damage, and the reduction of social welfare consequently. On the other side, government's over-supervision may be able to put an end to the stealthy emission, reduce the social cost of pollution, but leads to the reduction of social welfare due to the excessive supervision cost. Thus, government with the goal of social welfare maximization should make an optimal regulatory policy, including the commitment and effort to supervision, the fine on stealthy emission, and the award/penalty ratio for pollutant treatment enterprise, according to the production and emission of SMEs, the treatment capacity of the pollutant treatment enterprise, the situation of local economy development and environmental protection, and suchlike. As a result, the social welfare being maximized, meanwhile environment being protected, a win-win situation between economy development and environment protection is reached. Figure 1 .
The sequence of pollution regulation
B. The Model
There are n SMEs produce a same product. The production costs and market return of SME i . There is a same kind of pollutants generated in the production process, the quantity of which is related to the output, that is, SME i emits pollutants pollutants untreated without government regulation, so, government have to regulate SMEs' emission behavior. But even so, it is still possible that SMEs stealthily emit untreated pollutant with probability i  , namely, SME i emits untreated pollutants ii e  into the environment.
In order to facilitate the regulation and achieve the economies scale of pollutant treatment, government G concentrates SMEs together to production, and introduces a professional pollutant treatment enterprise E to treat the pollutants generated by all SMEs. Pollutant treatment enterprise charges SME i ( 
Emitting untreated pollutants into the environment can cause a certain damage and social costs, namely, loss of social welfare, which is the function of untreated pollutants into the environment,
is the total amount of untreated pollutants from SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise. Obviously, in the case of the same quantity of pollutants treated and untreated into the environment, the treatment cost is less that social cost, i.e.
S C
  , therefore, it is necessary to treat pollutants.
In order to prevent the stealthy emission behavior of SMEs, government decides to strengthen supervision and punishment. Clearly, under centralized treatment mode, pollutant treatment enterprise has a great information advantage on SMEs' emission, so government translates part of its supervision duty on SMEs to it, and promises a prize of a 1  proportion of the fine S  on SMEs' stealthy emission, as well as a fine of a 2  proportion of the fine S  in the case of government finds the SMEs' stealthy emission while pollutant treatment enterprise does not. The probability of government or pollutant treatment enterprise finds SMEs' stealthy emission is the function of the effort and cost incurred by regulation on SMEs,
, where
, which means that the probability is 0 without supervision while finding all the stealthy emission costs dearly, the probability rises with a decreasing margin as the effort and cost increases.
for any given GE cc  . Under centralized treatment mode, stealthy emission is not only from SMEs but also the pollutants treatment enterprise, so the government regulates its emission behavior too. The probability of government finds its stealthy emission is the function of the effort and cost incurred by supervision,
, where C , pollutant treatment cost  and unit price R , the probability of stealthy emission being found
, as well as award/penalty ratio for pollutant treatment enterprise
, are all common knowledge. As social costs caused by the pollutants are beard by the whole society, in which a SME is just a very small part, this paper assumes that the social costs beard by a SME is 0. Now, we can get the profit of SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , as:
We can get the profit of pollutant treatment enterprise as:
We can get the government's utility, namely, social welfare, as:
III. OPTIMAL SOLUTION ANALYSIS
Under centralized treatment mode, the target of government is the maximization of social welfare through designing a reasonable and feasible regulatory mechanism, including supervision cost, fine, as well as award/penalty ratio for pollutant treatment enterprise, in order to effect the pollutant treatment enterprise's policies of treatment, pricing and emission, as well as SMEs' policies of production and emission. Therefore, government is faced with the following programming:
  , , , , , ,
where
is the objective function of the government pollution regulation, that is, maximizing social welfare. (5) and (7) are respectively the incentive compatibility for SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise, that is, the (6) and (8) are respectively the participation constraint, that is the profits of SME i and pollutant treatment enterprise are nonnegative. (9) is a non-negative constraint, that is, all the decision variables are non-negative , including supervision costs
q , as well as probability of stealthy emission
Solving the above programming problem, we can obtain proposition1 as follow.
Proposition 1: Under centralized treatment mode, as long as the supervision costs of government and pollutant treatment enterprise are not 0, government is unable to achieve the optimal social welfare through supervision and regulation, fine for stealthy emission, as well as award/penalty for pollutant treatment enterprise.
Proof:
. therefore, only if the supervision costs of government and pollutant treatment enterprise were 0, or there were no stealthy emission even without supervision, social welfare should be maximized,
. But obviously, it is impossible. Any supervision from government or pollutant treatment enterprise incurs supervision costs, and once there is no supervision, pollutant treatment enterprise and SMEs emit pollutants untreated into environment, which raises social costs. Therefore, as long as the supervision costs of government and pollutant treatment enterprise are not 0, government is unable to achieve the optimal social welfare through supervision and regulation, fine for stealthy emission, as well as award/penalty for pollutant treatment enterprise. Proposition 1 Q.E.D. Proposition 1 shows that government can reduce stealthy emissions from SMEs or pollutant treatment enterprise through strengthening supervision and award and penalty but is unable to achieve the maximization of social welfare. The main reason is that, under centralized treatment mode, within the social welfare, the pollutant treatment cost for SMEs is the revenue of pollutant treatment enterprise; the costs of SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise caused by the fine equal the consequently income of government and pollutant treatment enterprise. Therefore, these incomes offset these costs, resulting in the social welfare has nothing to do with the unit price of treatment and the award and penalty on pollutants emission. As a result, the strengthening of supervision will just increase social cost and reduce social welfare, so government should quit supervision, resulting in SMEs directly emit all the pollutants untreated into environment to improve their profits at the cost of a much more badly damage on environment and social welfare.
Although government can not maximize social welfare through regulation, it still can achieve sub-optimal social welfare through strengthening supervision and award or penalty to reduce stealthy emission from pollutant treatment enterprise and SMEs, as long as
, that is, the added supervision cost is less than the reduced social cost.
IV. INCENTIVE MECHANISM
Under centralized treatment mode, the sequence of pollution regulation is as follows. Firstly, government decides its regulatory policy, including the effort and cost on supervision, Secondly, pollutant treatment enterprise makes the decision on unit price, R , supervision cost, E c , and probability of stealthy emission, E  , according to government's regulatory policy, in order to maximized its profit. Finally, SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , makes its policy of output, i q , and probability of stealthy emission, i  , according to the relative policies of government and pollutant treatment enterprise, in order to maximized its profit. This paper uses backward induction to solve the optimal decision of the government, pollutant treatment enterprise and SMEs.
Firstly, SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , makes its policy of product and emission to maximize its profit. As SME i has no preference between stealthy emission and emitting to pollutant treatment enterprise, the standard for its policy-making is to make the cost of stealthy emission equals the cost charged by pollutant treatment enterprise, that is,
Solving it, we can get the optimal probability of stealthy emission of SME i :
From (10), we can get Lemma 1 as follow. Lemma 1: The optimal probability of stealthy emission of SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , increases with the rise of unit price charged by pollutant treatment enterprise, and decreases with the rise of the probability of its stealthy emission being found (i.e., the effort and supervision cost of government and pollutant treatment enterprise), as well as the fine charged by government.
Proof: Individually solving the first order derivative of the optimal probability of stealthy emission of SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , with respect to the unit price, the probability of its stealthy emission being found, as well as the fine, we can get:
From (11) - (14), we can find that the optimal probability of stealthy emission of SME i is the strictly increasing function of the unit price, and the strictly decreasing function of the probability of its stealthy emission being found and the fine charged by government. Therefore, the optimal probability of stealthy emission of SME i increases with the rise of unit price, and decreases with the rise of the probability of its stealthy emission being found and the fine charged by government Lemma 1 Q.E.D. Lemma 1 shows that the higher the unit price charged by pollutant treatment enterprise, the greater the costs of SMEs emitting pollutants to it, so they will increase the probability of stealthy emission. Besides, the greater the probability of stealthy emission being found or the fine charged by government, the greater the cost of stealthy emission, so they will reduce the probability of stealthy emission.
After determining the probability of stealthy emission, SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , needs to determine its output. Substituting (10) into (1) and solving the first order derivative of its profit with respect to the its output, we can get:
, which is the reaction function of unit price, and supervision effort and cost of government and pollutant treatment enterprise. In other words, for a given unit price and supervision effort and cost, there is a corresponding optimal output SME i .
From (15), we can get lemma 2 as follow. Lemma 2: The optimal output of SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , decreases with the rise of the unit price, the probability of its stealthy emission being found, as well as the fine charged by government.
Proof: Individually solving the first order derivative of the optimal output of SME i , 1, 2,..., in 
, with respect to the unit price, the probability of its stealthy emission being found, as well as the fine, we can get:
     , which means optimal output of SME i decreases with the rise of the unit price, the probability of its stealthy emission being found, as well as the fine charged by government.
Lemma 2 Q.E.D. Lemma 2 shows that with the increase of unit price, the probability of its stealthy emission being found and the fine incurred consequently, a SME reduces its output. The main reason is that the emission cost of a SME increases with the rise of any of these parameters. As a result, a SME has to reduce its output to reduce its emission cost and total cost.
From lemma 1 and lemma 2, we can get that strengthening supervision or penalty on SMEs' stealthy emission can reduce untreated pollutants and social cost, and raise social welfare, but at the same time, reduces SMEs' output, and raises supervision cost, which leads to the loss of social welfare at last. Therefore, government has to make a tradeoff, not just raises the supervision or fine to threaten SMEs, or raises the award/penalty ratio to encourage pollutant treatment enterprise to strengthen supervision. In addition, the rise of unit price charge by pollutant treatment enterprise causes not only the increase of stealthy emission of SMEs, but also the decrease of their output, resulting in the double loss of social welfare. Therefore, government needs to guide the price-making of pollutant treatment enterprise instead of its pricing freely. Thus we can get proposition 2 as follow.
Proposition 2: Under centralized treatment mode, government needs to guide the price-making of pollutant treatment enterprise to increase social welfare.
Proof: The proof of proposition 2 is the analysis above. Proposition 2 Q.E.D.. Proposition 2 shows that under centralized treatment mode, the pollutant treatment enterprise gets a natural monopoly, which for sure is used to make a high unit price to obtain monopoly profit, resulting in the decrease of SMEs' emission and output, and the loss of social welfare at last. Therefore, government needs to guide their pricing behavior, such as, on the basis of ascertaining the cost of pollutant treatment enterprise and the plus ratio, using the cost-plus pricing method to set the guidance price to increase social benefits.
As the production cost, market return, pollutants emission of SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , social cost of pollutants, pollutant treatment cost and unit price, the probability of stealthy emission being found, the fine charged by government, and the award/penalty ratio are all common knowledge, pollutant treatment enterprise knows the reaction function of SMEs, according to which makes its optimal unit price, supervision cost and probability of stealthy emission to maximize its own profit.
Pollutant treatment enterprise has no preference between stealthy emission and emitting treated pollutant, to, so the standard for its policy-making is to make the costs of the two choice are the same, that is,
. Solving it, we can get the optimal probability of stealthy emission of pollutant treatment enterprise is as follows.
Under the optimal probability of its stealthy emission, its marginal cost of pollutant treatment is The optimal probability of pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission decreases with the rise of the probability of its stealthy emission being found and the fine incurred consequently; when its marginal cost of stealthy emission is bigger than that of pollutant treatment, its optimal probability of stealthy emission decreases with the rise of total pollutants emitted from all SMEs, on the contrary, it increases.
Proof: Individually solving the first order derivative of the optimal probability of pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission with respect to the probability of its stealthy emission being found, the fine incurred consequently, and the total pollutants emitted from all SMEs, we can get: From (21) and (22), we can get that the optimal probability of pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission decreases with the rise of the probability of its stealthy emission being found and the fine incurred consequently.
From (23), we can get that
, so its optimal probability of stealthy emission decreases with the rise of total pollutants emitted from all SMEs, on the contrary, it increases. Lemma 3 Q.E.D. Lemma 3 shows that the optimal probability of pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission decreases with the rise of the probability of it being found and the fine, and decreases with the rise of total pollutants emitted from all SMEs when its marginal cost of stealthy emission is bigger than that of pollutant treatment, on the contrary, it increases. The main reason is that the rise of the probability of its stealthy emission being found and the fine incurred consequently raising its cost of stealthy emission, it has to reduce its stealthy emission to save its relative cost. When its marginal cost of stealthy emission is bigger than that of pollutant treatment, its cost of stealthy emission increases more with the rise of the total pollutants emitted from all SMEs, so it has to reduce its stealthy emission to save its relative cost, on the contrary, it raises its stealthy emission to save its treatment cost.
As we know, one of the objectives of government's regulation is reduce pollutant treatment enterprise's stealthy emission and environment pollution consequently through enhancing the supervision and fine on its stealthy emission, or under the condition that the total pollutants emitted from all SMEs. In addition, when the strength of supervision or the fine is not great enough, resulting in pollutant treatment enterprise's marginal cost of stealthy emission is less than that of pollutant treatment, its stealthy emission increases with the rise of total pollutants emitted from all SMEs, causing a double damage on environment. Therefore, the practical meaning of lemma 3 is that government should make the fine on pollutant treatment enterprise as big as possible within the legal limits to raise its marginal cost of stealthy emission and reduce the behavior, especially when total pollutants emitted from all SMEs increase. So we can get proposition 3 as fellow.
Proposition 3: Government should make the fine on pollutant treatment enterprise as big as possible to regulate its emission behavior.
Proof: The proof of proposition 3 is the analysis above. Proposition 3 Q.E.D. After determined its optimal probability of stealthy emission, pollutant treatment enterprise makes decision on its optimal supervision cost and unit price. Substituting , , , , ,
which are the reaction function of government regulatory policies. In other words, given government's supervision cost, amount of fine, and award/penalty ratio, there are corresponding pollutant treatment enterprise's optimal supervision cost and unit price. As its treatment cost and pricing policy are common knowledge too, government knows its reaction function, and makes its regulatory policy according to it with the goal of social welfare maximization.
The goal of government's regulation is social welfare maximization through making a regulatory policy, including supervision cost, amount of fine, and award/penalty ratio. Substituting Substituting government's optimal regulatory policies into pollutant treatment enterprise's reaction function, we can get its optimal supervision cost, unit price and probability of stealthy emission. Substituting all the variable into the reaction function SME i , 1, 2,..., in  , we can get its optimal output and probability of stealthy emission, as well as sub-optimal social welfare at last.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
There are 10 SMEs producing a same product. The production cost, market return and quantity of pollutants of SME i , . Untreated pollutants directly emitted into environment leads to a certain social cost, which of unit pollutant is 15. In order to improve the efficiency of pollutant treatment, these 10 SMEs are concentrated to produce, and a specialized pollutant treatment enterprise is introduced to treat their pollutants at treatment cost 5Q   and unit price R charging them. In order to reduce costs, SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise stealthily emit untreated pollutants at the probability of i   incurs a fine of E  .
The upper legal limit of fine on SMEs and pollutant treatment enterprise is respectively 90 and 100. According to the analysis above, we can get government optimal regulatory policy as follow. Supervision cost is respectively . Under this regulatory mechanism, pollutant treatment enterprise's optimal unit price is significantly. Therefore, government must pay attention to the balance of the interests of all participants when making the guidance price.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We developed a pollution regulation game model under multiple principal-agent among government, pollutant treatment enterprise and SMEs to study the pollution regulation mechanism under centralized treatment mode. It is obtained through theoretic and numeric analysis that the optimal regulation mechanism, including government's regulatory policy, pollutant treatment enterprise's strategy of pricing, emission and supervision, as well as SMEs' production and emission strategy. It is found that as long as there is supervision costs of government and pollutant treatment enterprise, government can not achieve the optimal social welfare but the sub-optimal through supervision and regulation; government should charge a fine as big as possible on pollutant treatment enterprise instead of SMEs to reduce the emission of untreated pollutants; government should guide the price-making of pollutant treatment enterprise instead of making by itself freely to raise social welfare.
